On the Possibilities of Reconstructing Images of Textual Documents Obtained by Detecting Compromised Emanation from Computer Monitors

Borko Đaković 1 , Nenad Stojanović2,
Milena Grdović3and Jasmina Kovačević 4
1 University of Belgrade, School of Electrical Engineering and Center for Applied Mathematics and Electronics, Belgrade, Republic of Serbia
2 University of Defence, Military Academy and Center for Applied Mathematics and Electronics, Belgrade, Republic of Serbia
3 Center for Applied Mathematics and Electronics, Belgrade, Republic of Serbia
4 University of Defence, Military Academy, Belgrade, Republic of Serbia
borko.djakovic@vs.rs
nivzvk@hotmail.com
milena.grdovic@gmail.com
dzesmin_89@hotmail.com
DOI: 10.46793/BISEC25.230DJ

 

ABSTRACT: The paper shows the feasibility of reconstructing signals from a computer monitor by intercepting its compromising electromagnetic radiation. For the detection and reconstruction process, the pixel clock frequency of the HDMI interface was utilized. Based on this pixel frequency, its integer multiples were calculated, and the corresponding center frequencies were used to detect the unintended emissions. Reconstructed images are presented across six different frequency bands, representing the spectral harmonics of the pixel clock frequency. Furthermore, the paper discusses protective measures to prevent the leakage of sensitive information via compromising electromagnetic emanations.

KEYWORDS: Compromised Emanation, HDMI, Monitors, TEMPEST

ACKNOWLEDGMENT: This research has been a part of the project No. CPME/2/21-25 supported by the Ministry of Defence, Republic of Serbia.

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